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The paper reviews the literature on social capital and development and identifies key 
properties of this concept that are then used in a model illustrating the potential 
welfare effects from social capital, in terms of both wellbeing and economic benefits. 
The model focuses on access to inputs into the growth process and identifies 
necessary conditions for benefits from social capital in terms of the availability of the 
right kind of intermediary making access to capital resources possible, and the 
presence of supportive institutions which make minimum human capital and 
complementary goods available. 
 
JEL Codes: O16, O43, Z13  
 
Keywords: social capital, institutions, group lending, development. 
 
* Comments from Mark Casson, Robert Wade, Barbara Harriss-White and participants in 
the British Academy Conference on Social Capital and in the Conference on Institutions 
and Development are all gratefully acknowledged. 
 
  11. Social capital in development studies  
The concept of social capital surfaced in the development literature almost 
simultaneously over the past fifteen years in quite separate places.  Ahn and Ostrom 
(2008) in the Handbook of Social Capital make quite clear the concept has two 
distinct lines of heritage and associated criticisms: on the one hand the traditional 
neoclassic economic viewpoint the concept simply refers to the ‘cooperation 
enhancing effects of repeated interactions and networks’ and finds the concept 
essentially redundant (given reputation, trust and networks are all separately defined 
and rigorously studied already); from the perspective of collective-action theorists and 
behavioural economists, social capital offers a useful framework for studying the 
emergence of cooperation. The literature on the evolution of institutions has also used 
the concept, albeit rather loosely, in the context of informal institutions which play a 
very significant role in shaping formal institutions and the operation of markets, and 
can emerge as the preponderant rules of interaction when formal institutions and 
markets fail. In this context, social capital becomes central because the 'power of an 
actor' is directly measured by ‘the social capital available to the actor within that 
system, which is ruled by both informal and formal institutions: some actors only 
have access to primary and non cross-cutting social networks which limit their sphere 
of action (e.g. poor, low-caste, or women in some contexts), others can access both 
cross cutting social networks and institutional capital (Casson et al, 2010). 
 
Coleman is the author who can be credited with expressly introducing the concept of 
social capital as a key feature of the structures of social action
i. He describes social 
capital both as social organisations and as ‘not a single entity, but a variety of 
  2different entities having two characteristics in common; they all consist of some 
aspect of a social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are 
within the structure’ (Coleman, 1990, p.302). These entities in turn comprise 
obligations and expectations, information potential, norms and effective sanctions, 
authority relations, and appropriable social organisations. Social-structural resources 
can be considered as a capital asset to the individual, in the sense that it is individuals 
belonging to the structures who can use this form of capital as a productive resource. 
In particular, Coleman describes relationships in linear closed systems (i.e. those 
capable of establishing and maintaining effective norms) in terms of the expectations 
and obligations that bind each individual to the others. In this context, the social 
capital available to an individual is simply the sum of all the obligations running 
towards her from all other individuals. As the fundamental hypothesis is that each 
individual has some control over the others’ actions, the more they are obliged and the 
higher such control will be. In Coleman’s words the ‘power of an actor’ is ‘a direct 
measure of the social capital available to the actor within that system’.  
Coleman describes social capital as a good with a number of properties: it is not 
completely fungible and, akin to knowledge, it has certain public goods features, 
generating social returns higher than private ones and, as a consequence, under-
investment on the part of individuals. Intended investment in this construction does in 
fact not take place, as the self interested individuals on which the theory is based have 
no interest in producing something the benefits of which accrue to other individuals, 
so social capital comes about as a by-product of other activities.  
Putnam’s use of the concept in the context of explaining different regional 
performances in Italy (Putnam, 1993) has then generated a wide debate regarding both 
his interpretation of Italian history, his postulated directions of causality (from social 
  3capital to institutional performance to economic development), the assumptions 
regarding the initial distribution and production of social capital, the proxies used to 
measure it, and ultimately the usefulness of the concept itself.  Some writers reject the 
notion that social networks can be viewed as ‘capital’ in the traditional sense of 
yielding returns or of being depleted with use (Ostrom, 1997); Manski (2000) prefers 
to avoid the use of the term altogether, whilst Mosse thinks that ‘The attempt to 
synthesize the social and the economic in a theory of “social capital” poses questions 
about the relationship between norms, networks, associations, and collective action, 
but it also introduces unresolved problems: too many different social phenomena are 
bundled together, and the statistical concept of social capital is unable to grasp the 
historical dynamic between collective action, associations, and democratic practice. 
As theory, social capital is too vague about the mechanisms by which social 
interaction produces values or collective action, and as policy its causal relations are 
too unidirectional (from associations to collective action or democratic process) to be 
useful (Mosse, 2006, p. 720). 
In spite of this, or perhaps because of it, Putnam’s definition ‘features of social 
organisations, such as trust, norms and networks, which can improve the efficiency of 
society by facilitating co-ordinated actions’ is perhaps the most widely cited in the 
development literature (see Table 1), and most of social capital proponents in the 
development literature view it as a useful notion that can help reintroduce the ‘social’ 
in the development agenda, and point to its instrumental value in allowing access to 
resources, especially for the poor (World Bank, 2000). 
 
Table 1: Definitions of social capital 
Coleman, 1988  Aspects of social structure (obligations, expectations and 
  4trustworthiness of structures, information channels, norms and 
effective sanctions) that facilitate the actions of individuals within 
that structure. 
Putnam, 1993  Features of social organisations, such as trust, norms and 
networks, which can improve the efficiency of society by 
facilitating co-ordinated actions. 




Set of norms, networks and organisations through which people 
gain access to power and resources. 
Falk, 1998  Knowledge resources and identity resources on which people draw 
to generate social and economic outcomes. 
World Bank, 
2000 
Ability of individuals to secure benefits as a result of membership 
in social networks or other social structures. 
Portes and 
Landolt , 1996 
The capacity of individuals to command social resources by virtue 
of their membership in networks or broader social structures. 
Sobel 2002  Circumstances in which individuals can use membership in groups 
and networks to secure benefits 
Source: Della Giusta and Kambhampati (2006) 
 
Levels of social capital 
At the micro level, social capital coincides with social networks formed by 
individuals with intermediaries that facilitate access to human, financial and physical 
capital. These social networks can be small or large, and include few or many 
intermediaries of each type. They can also be more or less close, so that for instance 
  5an individual may be member of a group which does not include the right type of 
intermediaries, or, at the opposite end of the spectrum a privileged group may shut 
other groups out from accessing their intermediaries. It is clear that exclusive loyalty 
within primary social groups is not per se able to ensure material and immaterial 
benefits and can sometimes in fact hinder the very possibility, as witnessed by the 
work on intra-household conflicts and unequal allocation (Schultz, 1990; Lundberg 
and Pollak, 1994, 2003; Dobbelsteen and Kooreman, 1997; Chen and Woolley, 2001), 
by the exclusion at village level of the poorest from group-based microfinance 
(Rogaly and Roche, 1998; Morduch, 1999 and 2000; Paxton et al 2000; Gomez and 
Santor, 2001) and the costs and benefits associated with family- or ethic group based 
businesses networks (Ben-Porath, 1980; Sivramkrishna and Panigrahi, 2002; Haddad 
and Maluccio, 2003).  
Bridging (horizontal links) and linking (vertical links) are thus identified as crucial to 
micro-level social capital: access to networks of secondary associations with more 
heterogeneous membership (within which ties may cut across ethnic, caste, class, 
wealth, religion, location or other characteristics) has been described in the literature 
as key to accessing resources and opportunities, as well as being capable of 
complementing the role of the government and even providing a substitute in areas in 
which government policy is ineffective. Key to such bridges are individuals who are 
well placed to connect different groups endowed with different resources, which have 
been well documented amongst others by Krishna (2002) and Della Giusta (1999 and 
2006) but have otherwise not been very prominent in the development literature.  
Another important feature of trust-based connections is that they display economies of 
scope, in the sense that trust is based on successful interaction which is mutually 
beneficial in achieving a specific purpose (for example, accessing finance), but the 
  6same connections may be very useful for achieving related purposes (for example, 
accessing training) but totally unsuited for achieving goals that are widely different 
from the original (for example, accessing political representation) (see evidence of 
this in Casson and Della Giusta (2004 and 2006)). The result is that specific agency is 
exercised by different connecting individuals in different fields, as clearly illustrated 
by Krishna in his Indian study where different agents operate for economic 
development, for community peace, and for political participation (Krishna, 2002). 
Again, there can be downsides to bridging networks as well, as witnessed by the 
existence of exploitative and patronage-based relations. 
At the macro level, social or institutional capital describes the connection individuals 
have with institutions and their ability to avail themselves of their services; it thus 
involves local government institutions that both enable the scaling-up of micro level 
social capital and actually contribute to creating social capital. Institutions can do this 
by creating conditions that are favourable to entering and maintaining social networks 
on the one hand, and through social policy and the attitude they promote in public 
officials, on the other (see Lam, 1996 and Wade, 1985). Thus, if government 
institutions are not supportive it may be impossible for people belonging to certain 
social networks to scale up to macro-level social capital. The informal economy can 
in this sense be interpreted as a failure of scaling up from micro level to institutional 
social capital, which can be motivated by institutional failure, as well as lack of 
connecting individuals helping to build bridges across networks. 
A sticking point in the debate on the use of the notion of social capital by the World 
Bank and by extension the major development organisation has been the emphasis on 
the possibility of investing in social capital (sometimes even ‘injecting communities 
with social capital’) by fostering associations and ‘facilitating’ participation. Among 
  7many others Edwards, a former World Bank officer, describes the failure of lending 
programmes for investment in social capital (for example Russia and the Balkans), 
associated with “picking winners by pre-selecting certain organisations (usually 
urban-based NGOs and networks of the civic elite), spreading rivalry and creating 
backlash effects when such associations are identified with foreign interests; these are 
not genuine efforts to support civil society but misguided attempts to manipulate its 
shape in accord with Western liberal norms” (p. 56, 1999). Perhaps social capital is 
better understood as an example of irreducibly social good, more similar to culture 
than public goods provision. Taylor suggests that culture consists of “objects of value 
which cannot be decomposed into individual occurrences in the sense that they cannot 
be reduced to a set of acts, choices or other predicates of individuals; individuals 
cannot by definition possess such goods, rather they are features of societies” (p. 24, 
1990). The difference between social goods and public goods is that public goods are 
only instrumentally valuable, whereas social goods essentially incorporate common 
understanding of their value and are irreducible features of society as a whole; in this 
sense culture as ‘common understanding’
ii. This then means that social goods can 
only be produced by a whole society, ruling out the possibility of creating or selecting 
privileged actors in the process. Access to both networks and institutional capital 
obviously depend on historically and culturally determined power relations.  
The view adopted here is that social capital has both instrumental and intrinsic value, 
(Della Giusta, 1999 and 2003). An approach that views social capital as intrinsically 
valued by individuals as their well being is increased by belonging to social networks 
is also consistent with the recent literature on happiness and well-being which 
suggests that social capital (in the form of relationships and trust) is a major factor in 
explaining differences in happiness (Kahneman and Krueger, 2006; Layard, 2005; 
  8Frey and Stutzer, 2004). Layard points out that ‘key aspects of social capital, like trust 
and membership in voluntary associations, contribute greatly to happiness’ (p.179). A 
vast literature now connects various social and economic variables to well being and 
happiness indicators, which are increasingly being adopted alongside traditional 




There is now a vast empirical micro and macro literature relating indicators of 
networks density, trust and associationism to economic development (some of the 
most cited include Miguel et al, 2003 and 2006; Grootaert, 1999; Narayan and 
Pritchett, 1997; Knack and Keefer, 1997), which contains a variety of proxies for 
social capital indicators. The first macro studies of the latter part of the 1990s were 
usually relying on data on trust variables and incidence of associations from values 
and social surveys which were then used as explanatory variables in cross-country 
growth regressions, but recent studies by Miguel and others addressing the link 
between these proxies and industrialization in Indonesia find that high initial levels of 
social interaction in a district do not predict subsequent industrialization, and that 
industrialising areas see higher social networks density developing rather than the 
other way around. These studies also show that there is an important effect of 
migration and industrialization in nearby areas, which leaves some areas with 
declining social networks (Miguel et al, 2006). 
Perhaps more interesting are the results found by micro level studies (as Haddad and 
Maluccio 2003, who investigate the effect of networks membership on household 
welfare), which often devise context specific proxies for trust and networks 
  9membership and model the interaction between these and a variety of development 
outcomes in a more complex way.  Krishna (2002) uses data from Indian villages to 
illustrate the fundamental role of agency in ensuring that members of existing social 
networks can access a variety of resources, and stresses how the presence or absence 
of such agency is key to the process of development (in the form of material benefits 
as well as peace and political participation) through social capital. Cleaver (2005) 
provides a very useful example of the ways in which the very poorest in Tanzania 
cannot benefit from social capital, having social networks among other poor people 
who cannot help them and lacking institutional capital. This study provides also a 
powerful reminder of the dangers of the frequent conflation within the literature of 
individual and household, which as stated above is problematic as the household can 
itself be a source of exclusion for some of its members. Cleaver’s study illustrates the 
situation of women in wealthier households who have however no access to resources 
and whose position in similar to those of very poor households. Furthermore, by 
illustrating the interlocking disadvantages experienced by poor households (small 
family size and weak family networks, lack of assets -including labour power- which 
constrains their ability to engage in reciprocal collective activities, poor health, 
inability to articulate in public fora and the derogatory perceptions of other 
community members towards them), this study highlights the frequently forgotten 
complementarity between social and other forms of capital: social capital cannot be 
understood as a ready substitute for other missing capitals (human, natural, financial).  
Results highlighting both the role of missing capitals and the complementarity 
between micro and institutional social capital were obtained in our studies of social 
capital and microfinance in Mexico (Della Giusta 1999 and 2000; Casson and Della 
  10Giusta, 2005) and of social capital and the wellbeing of immigrant women in the UK 
(Della Giusta and Kambhampati, 2006). 
 
2. Modelling social capital and economic development 
 
The model that follows incorporates insight gained from empirical work, particularly 
relative to the need for suitable intermediaries and for complementary forms of capital 
(particularly human capital and complementary goods) and supportive institutions, 
into a framework in which individuals value their social relations and want to fulfil 
obligations (intrinsic value of social capital) and can gain access to capital inputs 
through their relations (instrumental value). 
The model assumes that individuals are concerned about the reputation effects from 
their observable interactions (an important point to include explicitly for a village or 
local neighbourhood setting in which this is likely to be the case) and investigates the 
conditions under which both higher social capital and economic development (in the 
form of higher income) can simultaneously be achieved. Such conditions include 
supportive local government institutions, which make human capital (and 
complementary goods) available, and suitable intermediaries, although this is not 
explicitly modelled in this paper (for a model of the role of intermediating institutions 
see Della Giusta, 1999, and for a model of the role trust brokers see Della Giusta, 
2005). The assumptions are in line with findings from the literature in experimental 
economics and neuroeconomics which is producing interesting results which deviate 
from what expected by the theory on microfoundations by examining brain processes 
taking place performing actions and assessing perceptions and the formation of beliefs 
(Fehr et al, 2005). This literature documents the deviation from self-interested 
  11behaviour, the emergence of social norms, and the general economics of reciprocity 
(Sobel, 2005; Smith, 2003; McCabe et al, 2003; Fehr and Gaechter, 2000). Using both 
evidence from psychological studies and social policy, as well as experiments, these 
studies show how notions of reciprocity inform actors behaviour and how individuals 
are willing both to punish people who violate norms and incur costs in doing so (Fehr 
and Fischbacher, 2004). There is also evidence which links responses of the brains of 
actors playing a trust game indicating that trust develops as a response to reciprocity 
(King-Casas et al, 2005), which confirms the interpretations of the workings of the 
brain given in experimental economics (Zak et al, 2005; McCabe et al, 2003). Similar 
modelling in the development literature has recently appeared (see Sethi and 
Somanatan; 2006; Routledge and von Amsberg, 2003; Francois, 2002) although these 
models focus on interactions which are not observed by outsiders, which is not 
necessarily useful when focusing on the restricted context in which many poor people 
live, and rely on having the ‘right’ proportions of trustworthy individuals and 
entrepreneurs or the right amount of successful transactions for development to 
happen, which rather obscures the process involved in the use of social capital and 
brings back to whether there is ‘enough’ of it. 
The formal structure follows the structure of the Ramsey growth model (Aghion and 
Howitt, 1998), introducing a new input in agents’ preferences, reputation, in order to 
investigate issues of micro and macro (or institutional) social capital and access to 
financial capital. Two types of agents exist, capital intermediaries, who can access 
capital and engage in financial intermediation (they can be thought of as traders, or 
moneylenders), and agents who do not possess capital and therefore must borrow in 
order to engage in an unspecified production process. Two alternative lending 
mechanisms are considered: it is possible to either borrow from intermediaries on an 
  12individual basis, for an interest rate that is determined by the lender on the basis of its 
profit maximisation, or organise jointly liable borrowing groups which use their 
reputation as collateral, and borrow at an interest rate that is determined on the basis 
of financial sustainability (revenues covering costs). Reputation-based mechanisms 
are modelled and their connection to individuals and group’s repayment performance 
investigated. The fact that borrowers are economically vulnerable is modelled with 
the introduction of shocks, and parameters are introduced representing the behaviour 
of local government institutions, to take account of their effect on the income 
vulnerability of borrowers and their possibility of accessing the credit market. A list 
of variables is introduced first, followed by a description of the functioning of the 
credit system. Then the two sides of the economy (lenders’ and borrowers’ choices) 
are analysed separately and the conditions for system equilibrium are discussed. 
Results are presented together with a summarising diagram and possible extensions 
are suggested. 
 
List of variables (bold for endogenous variables, normal for parameters) 
N = population 
n
e = borrowers without reputation 
n = individual borrowers 
n’ = group borrowers 
(n+n’)/N = γ = proportion of n
e re-introduced in the credit market through local 
government institutions livelihood-supporting intervention 
yh = borrowers income 
ch = borrowers consumption 
lh = borrowers units of labour (fixed and constant across borrowers) 
  13bh = fixed size capital loan per borrower 
μh = borrower’s reputation 
q = proportion of repaying borrowers in individual lending 
q’ = proportion of repaying borrowers in groups lending 
ρ = proportion of borrowers in individual lending that are unable to repay due to a 
production shock 
ρ’ = proportion of borrowers in groups lending that are unable to repay due to a 
production shock 
extμ = reputation effect that exists in groups 
p = interest rate on capital for individual borrowers 
p’ = nominal interest rate on capital in groups 
p’{1+[(1-q’)/q’][(1-ε1)(1-ρ’)+(1-ε2)ρ’]} = effective interest rate on capital for groups 
ε1 = proportion of voluntarily defaulting borrowers punished with expulsion 
ε2 = proportion of involuntarily defaulting borrowers punished with expulsion 
i = productivity of capital 
* = indicates equilibrium values 
The subscript h’ indicates values of variables for borrowers belonging to groups, when 
these differ from the values for borrowers in individual lending.  
 
Functioning of the credit system 
There initially exist two types of agents in the economy: agents (all identical to each 
other and denoted with the l subscript), that are endowed with capital and engage in 
money lending –henceforth moneylenders-, and agents (all identical to each other and 
denoted with the h subscript), that are endowed with labour (all with the same amount 
per agent) and reputation (μ) and borrow capital to engage in production. The income 
  14generated in production accrues partly to the lenders, through the flow of repayments 
from repaying borrowers, and the rest is consumed.  Agents  endowed  with  reputation 
can access credit either via individual lending from moneylenders, or through groups 
lending. Within both credit arrangements each agent endowed with reputation 
receives a fixed capital loan of size bh, which is renewed upon repayment of interest. 
Moneylenders charge a higher interest rate on loans than the nominal interest rate 
charged in groups lending. Due to joint liability within the latter, however, repaying 
borrowers must repay for part of the defaulting borrowers, so that the effective 
interest rate is higher than the nominal whenever default is present. Both types of 
lenders are assumed to have two different responses to borrower’s default, which 
depend on the reason for defaulting. In particular, they are able to expel only a part 
(ε1) of voluntary defaulters, and are prepared to help only a part (1-ε2) of involuntary 
defaulters. Involuntary default takes place when a production shock occurs, thereby 
impairing repayment. The present construction assumes that ε1 and ε2 are identical for 
both types of lenders, in order to underline only outcomes caused by differences in the 
lending mechanisms based on a different consideration of borrowers’ preferences, 
rather than based on differing attitudes towards default
iii. Re-entering borrowing once 
reputation has been lost is only possible through local government institutions 
intervention (for example they are targeted by a special credit programme)
iv. 
The crucial variables explaining the micro-level social capital dynamics are the 
repayment rates, and particularly their response to the characteristics of the credit 
markets (relative magnitude of n, n’ and n
e), credit providers’ attitude towards default 
(ε1 and ε2) and their relationship with the local government institutions’ reputations 
(parameter γ)
v. All agents with identical endowments of labour and capital have an 
identical production function and generate an identical level of income yh, which is 
  15used for repayment and consumption. Consumption will then be higher in case of 
default. Moreover, when default is punished, ch will be higher (being expelled from 
lending, the borrower will consume the loan
vi) than in the case of unpunished default 
(involuntary defaulters in both markets lose a part of their production as a result of the 
shock equal to pbh). The capital stock in the economy at any time is simply the sum of 
all loans made to borrowers: 
  K = bh (n + n’) 
and the depreciation flow is the sum of all loans consumed by punished defaulting 
members: 
  ∂K = {(1-q)[ε1(1-ρ)+ε2ρ] + (1-q’)[ε1(1-ρ’)+ε2ρ’]} K 
Through repayments additions are made to the capital stock, as repayments enable the 
lenders to make new loans, once deducted their costs (Cl).  
Overall, the dynamic of capital in the economy is described by: 
  K & = Y – C – (∂K + Cl)      (Equation  1) 
where C is total consumption and Y total income. 
Repayment implies renewal of the loan and conservation of the borrower’s reputation, 
so that reputation is maintained through repayment or unpunished default, and lost 
with punishment. The stock of reputations present in the economy at any point in time 
is simply the sum of all reputations present: 
  μ = μh ( n + n’) 
and the depreciation flow is: 
  ∂μ = {(1-q)[ε1(1-ρ)+ε2ρ] + (1-q’)[ε1(1-ρ’)+ε2ρ’]}μ 
The gross investment flow coincides with the repayments flow, so that overall, the 
dynamic of reputation in the economy is described by: 
  μ & = Y - C - ∂μ       (Equation  2) 
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Borrowers’ choice  
Borrowers’ preferences include both consumption (ch) and reputation (μh), and they 
face two sets of choices: which type of lending market to enter and, once in it, 
whether to comply with repayment obligations. Borrowers maximise utility under two 
dynamic budget constraints: the constraint determined by the availability of reputation 
( h μ & ), and the constraint on production determined by the availability of capital ( ). 
However, the constraints differ between the two markets, so that two separate 
maximisations are carried out to describe borrowers’ choice in the two cases
h k &
vii.  
 U  (ch , μh) = ch
β μh
1-β 
Choice in this well known framework derives from dynamic optimisation, but what 
distinguishes this model is that reputation is a variable with both intrinsic and 
instrumental value: it is desired per-se (provider of utility) and used to access credit 
(intervening production factor). The optimisation is therefore carried out considering 
two control variables, ch and μh and two state variables μh and kh (with reputation 
being both a control and a state variable to reflect its double function). The 
maximisation yields a relationship between the optimum growth rates of 
consumption, and of reputation and an expression for the productivity of capital as a 
function of the consumption to reputation ratio, the rate of capital (and reputation) 
depreciation, and the ratio of the partial elasticity of utility with respect to reputation 
over the partial elasticity of utility with respect to consumption. In particular, given 
that capital productivity coincides with the interest that households are prepared to 
pay for capital, the interest rate for both individual and group borrowing will increase 
the higher the proportion of punished defaulters, the lower the ratio of consumption to 
  17reputation, and the higher the relative preference given to consumption in utility 
(please see appendix for derivation of these results). 
 
Lenders’ choice 
Individual lenders maximise profits choosing a scale of operations (n) so as to 
maximise the difference between revenues and costs, determining the optimum value 
for the rate of interest on capital (p*). Let cl be the fixed costs per borrower faced by 
the lender (these costs include all the activity’s costs –screening, monitoring, 
enforcing-, including the reward to the lender), and n be the size of the individual 
lending market, so that cln provides the total fixed costs, pbhqn is the repayments 
(revenue), and bh(1-q)n[ε1(1-ρ)+ε2ρ] is the capital lent to punished defaulters, that is 
the capital losses. If n
e n/N is the flow of new borrowers in individual lending, and bh 
n
e n/N are new loans made to the re-introduced borrowers, then profits
viii will be given 
by: 
  π = pbhqn - cln- bh(1-q)n[ε1(1-ρ)+ε2ρ]- bh n
e n/N 
the maximisation of π with respect to n allows one to derive the optimum value for p: 
 p*  =( ) ( ) [ ] ρ ε ρ ε 2 1 1 / ) 1 ( / 1 / / + − ⋅ − + ⋅ + q q q N n b c
e
h l  (Equation  3) 
 
Groups’ lending constitutes an alternative mechanism for accessing credit, and is 
based on the external effect to reputations that exists in groups and that acts as a 
further incentive to repayment which is absent in individual borrowing. Their 
financial constraint is that revenues cover costs, and this determines the nominal rate 
of interest on capital
ix (p’*). Due to joint liability, repaying borrowers also repay for 
unpunished defaulters, so that the individual repayment from each borrower is: 
 p’bh {1+ [(1-q’)/q’][(1-ε1)(1-ρ’)+(1-ε2)ρ’]}   (Equation 4) 
  18and, if the group lending market size is n’, revenues can also be calculated. All other 
conditions being analogous to those faced by individual lenders, profit is simply the 
difference between revenues and costs and maximising this yields the interest   
charged in group lending as: 





2 1 ρ ε ρ ε + − ⋅
−















l ]       (Equation 5) 
 
Equilibrium conditions and results 
To achieve equilibrium, three conditions must hold: firstly, for both lending 
arrangements to exist simultaneously, the marginal and total utility for a borrower 
must be the same when choosing individual or group borrowing. Secondly, given that 
there are no differences in the level of technology and in the quantity and quality of 
labour used by borrowers in production, the productivity of capital must be the same. 
Finally, the equilibrium of demand and supply requires that the price borrowers are 
prepared to pay for capital equals the effective cost of borrowing determined by the 
prices set by the lenders.  
Thus the first condition (simultaneous existence of the two markets) states: 
 U  (ch, μh) = U (ch’, μh’)                   
Substituting the Cobb-Douglas utility functions yields: 
        (Equation  6) 
β μ μ μ μ
/ 1
' ' ' ) / ( / / h h h h h h c c =
The presence of the external effect to reputation in groups (μh’ > μh) means that: 
  ' ' / / h h h h c c μ μ >            (Equation  7) 
and: 
 c h > ch’        ( E q u a t i o n   8 )  
  19Note that, further to this, marginal utilities also have to be identical for the 
equilibrium to be stable, and this produces the same conditions stated in eq.7 and 8
x. 
The second equilibrium condition (identical capital productivity) requires that (eq. 9): 
       
() () [] ( ) ( ) [ ] ' ' 2 1 2 1 / ] / ) 1 [( ' ' 1 ' 1 / ] / ) 1 [( 1 1 h h h h c q c q μ β β ρ ε ρ ε μ β β ρ ε ρ ε ⋅ − − + − − = ⋅ − − + − −
      
And the final equilibrium condition (intersection of demand and supply) requires, 
substituting the optimum values from the households’ and lenders’ optimisations in 
the individual lending market that (eq. 10): 
  ( ) ( ) [ ]= + − − + ⋅ + ' ' 1 ' / ) ' 1 ( ' / 1 / / 2 1 ρ ε ρ ε q q q N n b c
e
h l  
 =  ( ) ( ) [ ] ρ ε ρ ε 2 1 1 /) 1 ( / 1 / / + − − + ⋅ + q q q N n b c
e
h l  
Considering together equations (7), (9) and (10) allows to determine
xi the result that 
the repayment rate in groups lending is higher than in individual lending: 
  q’ > q        (Eq. 11) 
with the actual values of q and q’ being determined by equilibrium condition 3. 
Note also that if q’>q and ε1 > ε2, from Eq. 10 follows that ρ’< ρ. The economic 
interpretation of this result is that a higher repayment in groups is associated with a 
lower exposure to production shocks for households that belong to them (i.e. when a 
reputation effect is present in a group, this indicates that the group also provides some 
kind of risk protection for its members). 
The study of the equilibrium repayment values q and q’ also shows that
xii: 
1) Repayment equilibrium rate is higher the lower the size of the loan relative to the 
cost of lending and the higher the share of excluded in the credit market. 
2) Repayment equilibrium rate is higher the stricter the lenders (ε1 and ε2). 
  203) Repayment equilibrium rate is higher the smaller the relative preference given to 
consumption in utility, and the higher the equilibrium consumption/reputation ratio. 
 
Extensions 
Modelling of the reputation effect in groups 
It is interesting to further analyse the reputation effect in groups, particularly since an 
ongoing issue in the microfinance literature regards the determination of optimum 
values for group size (m’*), considering at least some of the more controversial issues 
associated with social capital; most notably, the existence of potential negative sides 
at the level of the group, that have also been argued to have effects that propagate to 
the whole system. In order to describe explicitly the reputation effect in groups, the 
existence of group sizes for which such effect is decreasing, and even potentially 
negative must be therefore taken into account. A possible way for explicitly 
modelling the external reputation effect is to consider it as a function of its most likely 
determinants: group’s size per se (the larger the size, the lesser the cohesion of the 
group), and weighted with repayment (the higher, the higher the more the group can 
get large before negative effects set it) and with diffusion of group lending (again the 
higher, the more the group can get large before negative effects set in). 
If the effect takes the following form: 
  () ( 1 ' ' ' 1 '
2
1 2 − + − − = m n q m ext α μ )     (Equation  12) 
that is represented graphically below: 






The optimum value for group size





generating the optimum value for m’: 
m’* = α q’n’         ( E q u a t i o n   1 3 )  
The corresponding level of external effect can be derived and calculated at the 
individual level as well, to enable comparisons of utility for different group structures. 
 
Extension to individual lending 
The same idea can be applied to the individual lending market, in this case to 
determine the minimum size for a lender. If entry in this sector faces a barrier 
determined by a reputation endowment (where the reputation of a lender is simply the 
sum of the reputations of its repaying clients), then such barrier could again be 
described in terms of some proportion of the level of borrowers’ repayment rate 
(reflecting reputations, i.e. the consistence of social capital in the population of 
autonomous borrowers). The reputation barrier to entry for individual lenders would 
then help to determine a minimum size for each lender: 
 m*  ≥ αqn        ( E q u a t i o n   1 4 )  
 
3. Conclusions 
  22 
Several implications derive from the model’s results: 
1) Lending mechanisms based on social collateral (reputation effects) achieve higher 
repayment among their borrowers even when they have the same attitude towards 
default as individual profit-maximising lenders.  
2) More borrowers can access credit (and therefore have higher income) with lending 
based on social collateral, than with individual lending. 
3) The more the government shelters borrowers from shocks, the higher the 
compliance rates and the higher the number of borrowers that can access credit.  
4) Social capital in the system is the sum of reputations, therefore it increases with 
diffusion of group lending together with government help. 
The results of the model are supported by the literature on microfinance, particularly 
the relationship between successful microfinance institutions and complementary 
development institutions and governments
xiv. The case for reputations being sufficient 
(and direct sanctions not being necessary) is in contrast with much of the literature on 
lending to governments and reputation (see the classic study by Bulow and Rogoff, 
1989), however, note that the present model would also yield the same result if 
reputation was not intrinsically valued (that is if it was not a provider of utilty 
independent of its instrumental valued)
xv.  
The most relevant implications from the model are those relating to the relationship 
between social capital and development, and particularly the importance of the 
existence of socially-based intermediaries in making possible access to markets for 
the poor, the importance of government investment both in direct support of 
borrowers’ livelihoods, and in the social subsidy that they can provide as guarantors 
  23of individual reputations if public officials are themselves respected and maintain a 
credible reputation by delivering public services efficiently. 
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Individual borrowers’ choice 
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*         (Eq.a3) 
The condition for the value of the integral to converge requires that the rate of growth of utility be 
smaller than the inter-temporal discount rate: 














given the result in equation (a2), the above condition becomes: 





Group borrowers’ choice 
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and substitution in the fourth yields: 











− =        (Eq.a6) 
 
Demonstration that q’ > q 
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where: 















Rewrite equation 9 as:  
(1-q) e - d =(1-q’)  e’  –  d’        
where: 



























that can be substituted in the first equation to obtain: 
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that can be expressed as: 
(q-q’)[a – (1-q’)e’] = q’ (d-d’)     
Now recall that: 
d > d’ 
which means that the right hand side is positive, and observes the condition for the prices charged by 
group lenders to be positive: 
a’ > (1-q’)e’  
which implies that the term in square brackets on the left hand side is positive. The final implication is 
therefore that: 
q’ > q. 
 
Study of the equilibrium values q* and q’* 
The following study is carried out only for q*, but it applies to q’* as well. 
Equilibrium condition 3 produces an equation of second order. For its solutions to exist, the following 
condition must hold on the equation’s delta: 
(d-2e)
2 > 4e (a + e) 
It is possible to eliminate one of the possible solutions to the equation observing the expression for the 
interest rate can be rewritten as: 
i* = (1-q)e –d 
Given that: 
 i* > 0  
and 
0 < (1-q) < 1   
the following condition must also hold: 
2e-d > 0 
and this leaves the equilibrium value for q*: 
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that indeed produces values that belong to the region (0 , 1).  
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Repayment equilibrium rate is higher the lower the size of the loan relative to the cost of lending and 
the higher the share of excluded in the credit market. 
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Repayment equilibrium rate is higher the stricter the lenders (ε1 and ε2) and, given that it is 
hypothesised that voluntary default is punished more than involuntary default (ε1 > ε2), this also implies 
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The repayment equilibrium rate is higher the smaller the relative preference given to consumption in 
utility, and the higher the equilibrium consumption/reputation ratio. 
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i Although he credits the definition to Loury, who defined it as the set of resources that inhere in family 
relations and in community social organisation and that are useful for the cognitive or social 
development of a child or young person (Loury, 1977). 
ii On irreducibly social goods see again Sen’ entitlement approach (1981) and a useful critique by Gore 
(1997). 
 
iii  Thus for the individual lending market there will be qn repaying borrowers, (1-q)n  defaulting 
borrowers, (1-q)[ε1(1-ρ)+ε2ρ] defaulting borrowers punished by moneylender with loss of reputation 
and non renewal of loan, and (1-q)[(1-ε1)(1-ρ)+(1-ε2)ρ] defaulting borrowers that are not punished by 
moneylender.  For the groups lending market, analogously, there will be q’n’ repaying borrowers, (1-
q’)n’ defaulting borrowers, (1-q’)[ε1(1-ρ’)+ε2ρ’] defaulting borrowers punished with loss reputation 
and non renewal of loan, and (1-q’)[(1-ε1)(1-ρ’)+(1-ε2)ρ’] defaulting borrowers that are not punished. 
 
ivThus if N = n
e +n +n’ is the population, n
e are agents outside the credit market, γ = n
e (n + n’)/N= is 
the share of agents outside the credit markets that are supplied with reputation by the local gov. 
institutions in order to enter them, n
e n/N are agents supplied with reputation by the local gov. 
institutions that re-enter individual lending market and n
e n’/N are agents supplied with reputation by 
the local gov. institutions that re-enter groups lending market. The dynamic of n
e will therefore follow 
the expression e
e













v This parameter reflects government contribution to the creation of social capital, in the form of 
supporting borrowers. 
vi Borrowers do not save in this model, so if the loan is thought of in terms of equipment; in case of 
default this will be sold. 
vii Given that the utility function has the same specification in both cases, borrowers are not prevented 
from borrowing in both markets simultaneously, a point that will be furthered when considering a 
condition on the marginal utility from borrowing in the two markets. 
viii Note that profits are actual and not expected because the sources of uncertainty have been eliminated 
through the hypothesis of a deterministic approach to cheating that enables lenders to foresee default 
and incorporate the expected value of it in their calculation. 
ix The effective interest rate on capital in group-lending is determined also by the repayment for a share 
of defaulting members to which repaying borrowers are compelled. 
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⎛ . Given the results on consumption and reputation 
























produces the same results as the condition on total utility. 
 
xi See appendix for this. 
xii Again, the underlying calculations are summarised in the appendix. 
xiii That which maximises the group-level effect. 
xiv In particular they confirm the analysis of Besley and Coate (1995) in what refers to the fact that 
social sanctions make group lending the preferred alternative with respect to repayment. Note however 
that elsewhere (Della Giusta 1999) a more detailed analysis of the parameters reflecting the punishment 
strategies adopted by lenders with respect to defaulting borrowers is discussed, and it is suggested that 
the presence of reputation effects in groups is not per se sufficient to ensure high repayment, as the 
latter depends on punishment graduation and choice of punishment intensity as well. 
xv In Bulow and Rogoff the reason why reputation for repayment does not work because on losing its 
reputation by defaulting, the country can buy consumption-insurance contracts by paying cash in 
advance. This would be analogous to saying, in the present context, that borrowers can access a parallel 
savings-insurance market. Since reputation would then not be instrumental to access capital anymore, 
default would in this case indeed become the dominant strategy in both types of lending arrangements, 
but this would happen if and only if reputation also lost its second role of provider of utility. The latter   36
                                                                                                                                            
might certainly be assumed in the case in the context of a country borrowing on the international 
financial markets, but in the present case it would mean making a completely different set of 
assumptions concerning individual’s behaviour, which would of course alter all the results from the 
model. 